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Abstract
Anthropic reasoning is a form of statistical reasoning
based upon finding oneself a member of a particular refer-
ence class of conscious beings. By considering empirical
distribution functions defined over animal life on Earth,
we can deduce that the vast bulk of animal life is unlikely
to be conscious.
Keywords: Anthropic Reasoning, Consciousness,
Damuth’s law, Power Law
Introduction
Consciousness is a beˆte noir of the physical sciences.
Each and everyone of us is aware of his or her own con-
sciousness, and indeed it seems to be necessary in order
to carry out science, or at very least to give meaning to
its theories and results. Yet, the more neurophysiologists
probe the workings of the brain, the more of a phantom
consciousness appears to be. Some argue that even if
a complete neurophysical theory of the brain’s function
is determined, the “hard” problem of how phenomenal
experience is generated still remains (Chalmers, 1995).
Related to this issue is that we cannot prove definitively
that any other individual of the human race is conscious
and not a zombie that acts for all intents and purposes as
conscious. Consciousness is fundamentally a first-person
phenomenon with scientific discourse relegated to com-
paring reports with our own experience. Yet it is unrea-
sonable to doubt the consciousness of other humans, who
are constructed in the same way as ourselves, and who act
in the same way as ourselves. The same is not true of other
species, who are constructed from different body plans,
have very different neural structures, and act in signifi-
cantly different ways to ourselves. In the words of Nagel
(1974) “What is it like to be a bat?”, answering the ques-
tion of consciousness in animals seems hopeless. Whilst
Nagel was assuming that it is something to be like a bat,
it is entirely reasonable to ask the question of whether it
is anything to be like a bat. Most people would assume
that on a scale of organism complexity from human be-
ings, through vertebrates, invertebrates, etc. through to
non-living matter, a line can be drawn between organ-
isms experiencing phenomenal consciousness and those
that don’t. Descartes, for example, drew the line between
humans and non-humans. Others would argue that some
other species of mammal, and possibly bird as well as
some cephalopods are probably conscious. Some even
argue that insects might be conscious (Tye, 1997).
In this paper, I define consciousness in an operational
way by noting that the reference class of anthropic rea-
soning (Bostrom, 2002) must consist of conscious enti-
ties, possibly restricted in some way, such as the set of
terrestrial animals. Anthropic reasoning is best known
in the form of the Cosmological Anthropic Principle
(Barrow and Tipler, 1986) and the infamous Doomsday
Argument (Leslie, 1989).
Anthropic reasoning has been criticised on a number
of fronts, particularly where it has been applied to pro-
duce counter intuitive conclusions. For example, the fine
tuning argument has been used as evidence for a divine
creator, or as evidence for a Multiverse, and the doomsday
argument suggests that the human population will crash in
the not too distant future. Most of these objections have
been rebutted in Bostrom’s book (Bostrom, 2002), who
makes a well-argued case that anthropic reasoning can be
done validly. It is not the purpose of this paper to review
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to the structure of these arguments, objections raised, nor
rebuttals of those objections, as that is incidental to the
aims of this paper. However, two issues in particular are
pertinent: the reference class problem, and the measure
problem.
The issue of what constitutes the class of observers
from which the subject observer reasons he/she was ran-
domly sampled is known as the reference class problem.
For many examples of Anthropic Reasoning, precisely
what constitutes the reference class does not bear much
on the conclusions of the reasoning. Bostrom (2002) gives
examples of this. In this paper, we very much turn the rea-
soning on it head, and ask what can we establish about the
reference class, given the observation of what we are, and
other information we might have at hand.
It might be argued that the reference class used for
anthropic reasoning should only include those observers
capable of understanding anthropic arguments, or more
widely, those conscious entities capable of introspection.
It is not at all clear whether this would include all humans,
just a subset of humans, or non-human species as well.
Conversely, the widest possible reference class is the set
of all conscious observers, the interpretation I wish to use
here. An alternative reading of this paper is that it is not
talking about consciousness per se, but what is, or is not,
allowable within the anthropic reference class.
The measure problem comes from extending anthropic
reasoning to infinite sets of observers, such as we would
expect to be the case in a Multiverse. In the set N =
{0,1,2, . . .}, we might be tempted to say that the set of
even numbers has measure 0.5. Yet if we write the set
in a different order as N= {0,1,3,5,2,7,9,11,4, . . .}, the
same line of argument produces a measure of 0.25. How-
ever, with respect to the arguments given in this paper, this
measure problem doesn’t arise, as the measure is already
known empirically.
To consider the title question of this paper, we only
need to note that there are considerably more ants than hu-
mans in the world. It is estimated that ants monopolise be-
tween 15–20% of the terrestrial animal biomass (Schultz,
2000), far exceeding that of the vertebrates. A typical sub-
urban house garden will contain city-scale populations of
ants. A naı¨ve application of anthropic reasoning would
conclude that ants could not be conscious, as otherwise
we would expect to be an ant rather than a human.
Unfortunately this usage of anthropic reasoning raises
the Chinese paradox. Why wasn’t I born in the most pop-
ulous nation on Earth, China, which has 50 times the pop-
ulation of my country of birth, Australia?
Furthermore, ants are not a single species, but are tax-
onomically speaking a family, with which we are com-
paring a single species homo sapiens. It would be better
to rephrase the question in a way that didn’t depend on a
somewhat human-biased taxonomic scheme.
In the rest of this paper I show that the Chinese para-
dox is actually not a problem for anthropic reasoning, and
in so doing demonstrate a previously unknown process
for generating power law distributions. Then by recasting
the ant consciousness problem into a question of expected
body mass, which is an objective physical measurement
rather than a possibly subjective classification, and includ-
ing the proper handling of the Chinese paradox, we can
conclude that the vast majority of animal species (partic-
ularly the small ones) are unlikely to be conscious (or in
the reference class, if you prefer) by anthropic reasoning.
Chinese paradox
China has well over a billion people, and along with India,
has by far the biggest population of all the nations in the
world. I happen to live in Australia, for instance, a country
with around 1/50th the population of China. It would be
absurd to conclude that Chinese people are unconscious,
so naı¨vely one would expect on anthropic grounds to be
Chinese or Indian. At first sight this looks disastrous for
anthropic reasoning, until you realise that it is ill-posed.
Suppose you asked the question of what is the chance of
being Chinese versus not being Chinese. There is about
a 20% chance of being Chinese, and 80% not, so it then
becomes unsurprising to not be Chinese.
We can rephrase the Chinese question in a different
way: What is the expected population size of one’s coun-
try of birth? It turns out (see Fig 1) that there are far
more countries with fewer people, than countries with
more people. The relationship between population size
and the number of countries looks roughly proportional
to 1/x, where x is the population of the country. This law
is an example of a power law, and it appears in all sorts
of circumstances, for example the frequency with which
words are used in the English language.
With a 1/x power law, the number of countries of a
2
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Figure 1: Distribution of national populations in the year 2005, plotted on a log-log scale. (US Census Bureau,, 2005).
Also plotted are the best fits for a power law (slope -1.05) and lognormal (µ = 14.8,σ = 2.5).
given population size exactly offsets the population of
those countries, so anthropically speaking, we should ex-
pect to find ourselves in just about any sized country, with
the same probability. Being in a country with a popula-
tion the size of Australia’s would be no more surprising
than being in a more populated country such as the US or
China.
However, the actual distribution of country populations
turns out to be a log normal distribution, 1 whose proba-
bility distribution is
p(x) =C/xexp(−(lnx− µ)2/2σ2). (1)
The parameters µ and σ can be found by means of the
maximum likelihood method outlined by Clauset et al.
(2009). In fact one can compare the likelihood of the log-
normal distribution explaining the population data with
the likelihood that the 1/x power law explains it, and it
turns out to be of the order of 1011 times as likely. Simi-
lar results hold for other population datasets in the range
1965–2005. So indeed it would be more likely for one to
1Thank you to Aaron Clauset for pointing this out.
find oneself in a middle ranked country like Kuwait or Es-
tonia, than in the most populous nations of India or China.
However, the effect is not marked. India and China to-
gether have about 2.4 billion people, and the total number
of people living in countries with populations in the range
10–100 million is about 2.1 billion, and in the range 100
million to a billion is about 1.5 billion.
Given the ubiquity of power laws, and the fact that a
1/x power law exactly neuters any observer selection ef-
fect as in the above case, might a 1/x power law be a
signature of an arbitrary, or random classification?
Mass distribution of animal species
OK, well let’s get back to our ants, and ask the question of
what is the expected abundance of our species, assuming
we are randomly sampled from all conscious species on
the Earth. The distribution of species populations tends
to follow a power law, with a typical rank-abundance plot
within a species size class following a power law A ∝ rm
with exponent m = −1.9 (Siemann et al., 1999), where A
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is the abundance of the the rth most abundant species.
Rank-abundance plots are related to cumulative size dis-
tributions (Newman, 2005):
r(A) = N
∫
∞
A
p(x)dx (2)
where N is the total number of species in a size class, and
p(x) the distribution of species abundances. Solving (2)
implies p(A) is also a power law, with exponent −1.52.
By the argument in the previous section, we would there-
fore expect to find ourselves to be one of the many species
with few individuals, if all animals were conscious, as the
distribution of abundances falls off faster than 1/A. Yet
our species abundance is many orders higher (6× 109)
than the minimum abundance for viability (approx 103).
However, for the most part of our species’ existence on
the Earth, our abundance was much less, and perhaps in-
tegrated over time, our total abundance is not so different
from that of other species of our size class.
However, let us ask a different question: “what is our
expected body mass if we are randomly sampled from the
reference class of conscious beings?”. For this we need
the abundance distribution P(m) as a function of body
mass.
There is a well known biological law (called Damuth’s
law) (Damuth, 1991) that states the population density of
a species is inversely proportional to the 3/4ths power
of that species’ body mass, i.e. A ∝ m−3/4. To turn
this result into the mass distribution of individuals P(m),
we need to multiply this law by the mass distribution of
species S(m). Informally, we note that there are many
more smaller bodied species of animals than larger ones;
there are many more types of insect than of mammals,
for example. The exact form of the distribution func-
tion S(m) is still a matter of conjecture. Some theoret-
ical models suggest that S(m) is peaked at intermediate
body sizes (Hutchinson and MacArthur, 1959), and ex-
perimental results appear to confirm this (Siemann et al.,
1999), although it must be admitted that the latter study
was confined to insects, and ignored the huge diversity
of nematodes. Of more interest was the finding that
S(m)∝ P(m)0.5 (Siemann et al., 1999) (Siemann et al. use
I(m) instead of P(m)). Writing
P(m) ∝ S(m)m−3/4 ∝ P(m)1/2m−3/4, (3)
we can solve for P(m) as
P(m) ∝ m−3/2. (4)
By the same arguments as above, we should expect to
find ourselves near the lower body mass of the class of
conscious animals, ruling out the vast majority of animals
that are insects etc.
Bayesian formulation
The argument can be cast in a Bayesian framework in the
following way. Let A represent the hypothesis that all an-
imals are conscious, and B represent the observation that
our observed body mass is greater than (for arguments
sake) 10kg.
The previous argument could be criticised as suffering
from what is known as the “Prosecutor’s fallacy”. The
value p(B|A) can be computed from (4) by integration:
p(B|A) =
∫
∞
10kg
P(m)dm (5)
=
(
10kg
m0
)−1/2
(6)
≈ 10−5 with m0 = 1µg (7)
where m0 is the minimum mass of a conscious animal un-
der hypothesis A. A suitable choice for such an animal is
C. elegans, a 1mm long nematode with a nervous system
consisting of 302 neurons. The mass of an adult C. ele-
gans is around 2µg (Knight et al., 2002). Even if we were
to limit the discussion to animals of the size of ants (our
titular species) or bigger (60µ g – 2mg (Kaspari, 2005)),
p(B|A)≈ 10−4.
However, the question we really want to know the an-
swer to is what is p(A|B) — what is the likelihood of all
animals being conscious, given that our observed body
mass is more than 10kg?
Bayes law is written as
p(A|B) =
p(B|A)p(A)
p(B)
(8)
The term p(A) represents our prior conviction in A. We
can, for the sake of argument, assume p(A) = 1 here. Any
lesser value only increases the force of this argument.
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The final term p(B) is the probability of observing
one’s body mass greater than 10kg. Since we don’t know
the mass distribution of conscious beings, we cannot cal-
culate this value directly. However, we can use a form of
anthropic reasoning introduced by Gott III (1994). In that
case, Gott argued that a number drawn at random from a
uniform distribution on the numbers 1 . . .N would find its
value to lie in the range (0.5N,N] with confidence 95%.
Suppose instead that the numbers were ordered according
to some attribute m, drawn from some unknown distribu-
tion M(m). Then by the same argument, we can say that
with 95% confidence
∫
∞
m
M(m′)dm′ > 0.05. (9)
But the left hand side of (9) with m= 10kg is just our term
p(B), where M(m) is the unknown distribution of masses
of conscious observers. Thus with confidence c ∈ [0,1),
we can assume p(B)> 1− c.
Plugging this into (8), our confidence in hypothesis A
being wrong is
c = 1−
√
p(B|A) (10)
which is 99.7% for nematodes and 99% for ants. By con-
trast, for the proposition that all mammals are conscious,
our confidence in this being wrong by (10) is only about
90%, using the smallest known mammal mass of about
2g for the Pygmy Shrew. 90% is generally considered not
statistically significant, so anthropic reasoning cannot be
used to rule out the consciousness of all mammals without
further refinement of p(A).
Conclusion
In this paper, the reference class of anthropic reasoning is
used as a way to reason about the species of animals that
could be conscious. Considering the reference class to be
all conscious animals on the Earth, one applies known dis-
tributions of species abundances to determine that: one’s
nationality is not expected to be any particular country,
owing to a 1/x distribution of population sizes; that one’s
body mass should be near the lower limit of the set of con-
scious animals; and the abundance of one’s own species
should be near the lower limit of species abundances.
Considering our body mass is substantially higher than
the average animal (who is an insect, or even possibly
a nematode), we can conclude that the vast bulk of the
animal kingdom is unlikely to be conscious. We might
also conclude, based on the high present abundance of
humans, that most species of our mass class are also not
conscious, since we should also expect to find ourselves
near the lower limit of species abundance of conscious
species. But this would be a mistake — it is only natural,
assuming we’re born human, to be born in an era of high
human abundance. Integrated over our entire species life-
time, the total human abundance may not be so different
from that of other species in our size class.
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